By K.I. Angelopoulos

It is no surprise to anyone in public life that the government and Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis are under constant attack by long-established entangled business and political interests.

The casus belli for members of these circles has been clear from the outset: First of all, the change of power that occurred on March 7 of last year deprived them of profitable channels to various official and unofficial centers of power; second is the fact that this change of power invariably meant that the substrata of these circles no longer had the backing of higher authorities, and Karamanlis’s refusal to cooperate with some of the spoilt stars of these circles only served to inflame their anger.

The political influence that they pointedly exercised in the public domain for years was a privilege whose loss the members of these corrupt circles are unwilling to accept. And this serves to explain the bitter onslaught that has been waged upon Karamanlis’s administration by the real losers of last March’s general elections. It also explains the strong resistance by these same circles to new legislation to restrict the access of media barons to state contracts.

Following a constitutional revision in 2000, legislation was approved in 2002 that was designed to crack down on corruption but which did not tackle alleged corruption by relatives. At the beginning of 2003, a top-ranking European Commission official sent a letter to the government disputing the compatibility of Greek law and European law regarding this bill.

The then government, under Costas Simitis, failed to defend the Greek rule of law and the constitutional changes — which it had ostensibly approved to curb corruption — as being compatible with European law. No one questioned the Commission’s objections at the time, and no one seemed concerned with them.

Karamanlis’s government faced the same criticism from the EC — indeed from the same official — after it approved the law restricting media barons’ access to state contracts according to constitutional provisions and taking into account the jurisprudence of the Council of State. The argument put forward was almost exactly the same as that of 2003. And when the government started defending itself, its political opponents from PASOK appeared outraged at this defense. How dare the government answer back to the Commission?

With the war now raging, the premier continually rejects requests to meet with those seeking to regain their lost privileges, sending a warning out in all directions that he does not intend to change his stance. As a close aide of the PM’s confided to Kathimerini, “Karamanlis is not interested in playing the role of a prime minister who is a friend to those with entangled interests, regardless of the difficulties he may face in solving the country’s crucial problems.”

However, his rivals continue to believe that by maintaining their attack, they will eventually succeed in grinding down his resistance until he agrees to compromise with them.

Members of these circles continue to hover on the sidelines of the political and business worlds, in the firm conviction that Karamanlis’s leadership will be unable to see out this extremely difficult year, faced with their solid experience in games played on the political sidelines and their strong roots in areas that could do harm to the government.

Moreover, it is well known that members of these circles are already trying to establish a foothold in the ranks of today’s PASOK, with the help of certain private television channels and certain veterans of the party currently led by George Papandreou.