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Decoding Erdogan: What to expect from a fresh term?

Analysts review the factors behind the Turkish president’s political success and assess his potential foreign policy toward the West and Greece

Decoding Erdogan: What to expect from a fresh term?

As Turkish voters head back to the polls on Sunday for a crucial presidential runoff election, where they will choose between an incumbent leader with increasingly authoritarian tendencies and an opposition that promises to restore democracy, three analysts delve into the factors contributing to Erdogan’s enduring political career. Furthermore, they offer an evaluation of his potential foreign policy toward the West and Greece, should he emerge victorious in the elections.

ALAN MAKOVSKY

Senior fellow for national security and international policy, Center for American Progress

decoding-erdogan-what-to-expect-from-a-fresh-term0If we take for granted that Erdogan will win the runoff election, should we prepare for him to become an even tougher leader? Some believe that after being freed from the pressure of re-election, he may become more moderate.

One-man regimes are notoriously hard to predict. Assuming Erdogan wins, he will feel vindicated in both his domestic and foreign policies. At home, further authoritarian measures aimed at silencing his opponents are virtually certain. In foreign policy, he will be in no mood to kiss and make up with the West; he was infuriated during the campaign by the perception that the West was backing Kilicdaroglu. His instinct will be to continue Turkey’s drift toward neutralism, albeit without leaving NATO. (He recently asserted that “our relations with Russia are no less important than our relations with the United States.”) He will, however, have to deal with his deteriorating economy, and he will not be able to count indefinitely on Russian and Saudi largesse. The West is still Turkey’s largest export market and the major source of FDI; that reality may bring out Erdogan’s pragmatic side.

Is it an exaggeration to say that Erdogan will now rule unopposed? What should we expect for the day after in the opposition?

He will essentially rule unimpeded, yes. The opposition will have little power. Erdogan will tighten his grip on the judiciary and probably extend his influence in the military as well. The group with the greatest influence will be the ultranationalist MHP, which is now an absolutely crucial part of his coalition in parliament. It wouldn’t be surprising to see the MHP demand some cabinet seats this time; they did not in 2018.

What do you think it means that despite the deep economic crisis in Turkey and his 20 years in office, Erdogan is standing tall politically?

Four factors: 1) Religious support. I’d guess something like 25% of the public lionize him as a hero – and seem willing to follow him blindly – because of what he’s done to elevate the rights and self-esteem of the religious community. 2) Playing to nationalist pride. He’s scored with nationalists in a number of ways: pursuit of a muscular and independent foreign policy; his success in raising Turkey’s profile on the regional and, to some extent, global diplomatic stage; the emergence on his watch of unprecedented advances in Turkey’s arms industry, most notably TB2 armed drones, which have reportedly been ordered by more than two dozen nations. 3) Negative campaigning/demonizing the opposition. He portrays the opposition as pro-PKK, pro-LGBTQ, tied to the West, and altogether outside the mainstream of Turkish values. In the process, he is demonizing not only the opposition but also Kurdish citizens, LGBTQ citizens, and the secular community. All of this play particularly well in the Sunni, central Anatolian heartland. 4) Government largess. For example, he has repeatedly raised the minimum wage (three times in the past year), lowered the retirement age for government workers, and pledged to all Turks a certain amount of free natural gas from the Black Sea field. For voters who are responsive to these four factors, these considerations clearly count more than the economic situation.

By smashing expectations of opposition success generated by pre-election polls, the May 14 results projected the impression of a grand Erdogan success. And it was a success but not an unmixed one. The Justice and Development Party [AKP] failed to win a parliamentary majority on its own for the third time in the past four elections. The AKP lost seven points off its total in the previous election, falling to roughly 35% of the vote, its lowest total since its first election in 2002. And, of course, Erdogan has been forced to a runoff for the first time in his three direct-vote presidential elections. So there are plenty of warning signs of deteriorating support.

What is most likely for Turkey’s relations with Greece? Will the momentum from the earthquake diplomacy continue or will we see a resurgence of tensions in the region?

Given Turkey’s economic situation, Erdogan is likely to maintain the post-earthquake calm with Greece, at least in the near term – albeit without making any concessions on his claims in the Aegean and Eastern Med. Regarding Cyprus, there is likely to be no backing away from the “two-state solution” policy; a return to negotiations over the Cyprus problem is unlikely. As noted, Erdogan is unpredictable and will switch course in any direction when he deems it in his overall interest (as he has shown in his regional rapprochement initiatives). The MHP will consistently try to push him in a nationalist direction, but Erdogan will remain firmly in charge.

OZGUR UNLUHISARCIKLI

Director, Ankara Office, German Marshall Fund of the United States

decoding-erdogan-what-to-expect-from-a-fresh-term2If we take for granted that Erdogan will win the runoff election, should we prepare for him to become an even tougher leader? Some believe that after being freed from the pressure of re-election, he may become more moderate.

If Erdogan gets elected his main concern will be the transition of power to the next leader of his party. Meanwhile, he will need to manage a very challenging economic situation, which he created. He can be expected to remain tough domestically to keep the reins of power before the transition, but more pragmatic on foreign policy in order to have access to international capital inflow.

Is it an exaggeration to say that Erdogan will now rule unopposed? What should we expect for the day after in the opposition?

Ιt is not an exaggeration to say that Erdogan will now rule unopposed. He already has maintained a majority in the parliament, so if he retains office, he will be unopposed. Despite the deep economic crisis in Turkey and his 20 years in office, Erdogan is standing tall politically. This is the power of polarization and identity politics. In any country most of the voters vote emotionally based on their social identity.

What do you think it means that despite the deep economic crisis in Turkey and his 20 years in office, Erdogan is standing tall politically?

While I don’t expect Erdogan to change his economic policy right away, we also know it is not sustainable. Turkey will need to go back to orthodox monetary policy at some point, though it is difficult to say when and how.

Should we expect any change a) in economic policy and b) in foreign policy in terms of Turkey’s relations with the countries in the region?

Erdogan was in the process of changing his foreign policy even before the election, mainly because of Turkey’s economic situation. Normalization processes with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and perhaps with Syria, as well as a de-escalation in tensions with Greece are examples of this. If the Biden administration decides to engage Erdogan more closely after the election, we could see further changes.

What is most likely for Turkey’s relations with Greece? Will the momentum from the earthquake diplomacy continue or will we see a resurgence of tensions in the region?

In terms of Greek-Turkish relations, if the two countries were able to bridge their differences in the foreseeable future, this would be a very pleasant surprise. However, history shows that Greece and Turkey can maintain constructive relations when they both choose to. I think that after critical elections are left behind in both countries, we could see another period of constructive relations.

HAKAN AKBAS

Senior adviser, Albright Stonebridge Group

decoding-erdogan-what-to-expect-from-a-fresh-term4What do you think it means that, despite the deep economic crisis in Turkey and his 20 years in office, Erdogan is standing tall politically?

Erdogan has been in power for over 20 years, centralizing power without checks and balances, politicizing the judiciary which he used as a weapon against his political opponents, and establishing unparalleled control over the media, press and even popular social media outlets such as Twitter. He also benefits from state resources, which helped him fund insane populist promises – early retirement for about 2 million people, doubling the minimum wage, offering free heating gas for households, financing high-profile reconstruction projects in the earthquake zone, subsidized massive lending for consumers and SMEs, and mega-projects.

Erdogan molded Turkey into a regional heavyweight that plays a growing role from Syria to Libya to Ukraine. He has tapped into the rising nationalism among young voters, showcasing the nation’s first drone carrier and drone program at Teknofest events and campaigning based on the defense industry and Turkey’s first locally built electric vehicle, the Togg.

Erdogan is a charismatic, gifted campaigner, loved by the masses at rallies. He thrives on culture wars and divisive, polarized fear-based rhetoric that always helped him consolidate and mobilize his voter base. For example, he ended his campaign by reciting the Holy Quran and praying with the masses at Hagia Sophia.

President Erdogan is also a political genius, knowing how to read the emotions of voters, how to get rid of political enemies (e.g. Selahattin Demirtas, Ekrem Imamoglu) and broker alliances to damage the opposition (e.g. Muharrem Ince) or to capture more voters where he knows he is most vulnerable. His ruling alliance partner, the Nationalist Movement Party [MHP], for example, doubled its numbers over the weekend vs 2018. Even when his voters were penalizing the Justice and Development Party [AKP], they still preferred to stay in the family and vote for the MHP or the religious conservative New Welfare Party [YRP] or even the Free Cause Party [HUDA PAR], popular with conservative Kurdish voters.

In Greece, we wonder how these elections could affect Turkey’s foreign policy in our region. There are two main questions: a) If Kilicdaroglu is elected, will he change Erdogan’s policy? b) If Erdogan is elected, will he be a different Erdogan? In the background, we also note Turkey’s relations with the West here.

If President Erdogan wins the election, then his marquee foreign policy initiatives, including diplomacy with former regional adversaries such as Greece, Israel and Egypt, and maintaining a pro-Ukraine stance without being anti-Russian, are likely to continue. After a long period of regional isolation caused by an assertive regional policy, particularly in the East Med, Erdogan has recently prioritized rebuilding positive relations with Turkey’s regional neighbors to attract economic support for the Turkish economy. The disaster diplomacy after the devastating earthquakes helped further. Over the past two years, for example, Turkey has normalized relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia and aggressively courted Gulf investments to buoy its struggling economy.

The opposition would likely continue these initiatives as well. Diplomatic rapprochement with Egypt and Syria is popular, especially towards Damascus, as support for returning Syrian refugees to Syria is high and dominated the election cycle.

Regardless of who wins, Turkey’s territorial disputes and high tensions with Greece and Cyprus are likely to continue as well. Visa liberalization, a customs union upgrade and migrants will continue to dominate the agenda between EU and Turkey. A Kilicdaroglu presidency would likely lead to a better balance with the West, with a less mercantile and combative tone. Kilicdaroglu has indicated that, under him, Turkey would attempt to meet all benchmarks for admission to secure EU membership for Turkey.

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