No olive trees planted in joint Mideast mission
One has to hand it to Foreign Minister George Papandreou. His flair for public relations is impeccable, no matter how many doubts his rivals in PASOK might have as to the end-result. So there is nothing unusual in the fact that, in the first few days after the Israeli invasion of the West Bank, Papandreou realized how important it was to visit Ramallah. Greece has always had ambitions of playing a role, albeit a secondary one, in the Middle East, but its participation in the European Union’s troika as of the second half of this year and its turn at the helm of the rotating EU presidency in the first half of 2003, are no doubt incentives for involvement in an issue that will continue to be at the center of international politics. An equally important incentive, if not the most important, is that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat is popular with the Greek public, particularly among the PASOK cadres. It would have done the foreign minister’s reputation no harm if he had been the first to break the siege of Arafat, 20 years after his father had rescued Palestinian fighters from a besieged Beirut. His plan was too ambitious to succeed, therefore Papandreou at first had to restrict his visits to Egypt and then Saudi Arabia. The Israelis wanted to keep Arafat completely isolated and, naturally, they did not want any official guests around while their army engaged in their mopping-up operations. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had not allowed the EU’s representatives – Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana – to visit the Palestinian leader, so there was no way they were going to give the Greek foreign minister the chance. Even US Secretary of State Colin Powell had to tour around various capitals in the region before arriving in Ramallah. Despite the failure of his first attempt, Papandreou did not give up. Although his associates claim that the idea of a Greek-Turkish initiative had been on the cards from the outset, there is no doubt that Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem was brought in later to facilitate matters. Israel gives far greater importance, for geopolitical reasons, to its relations with Turkey, with which it has also signed valuable arms contracts. Nativity Church The Sharon government gave the green light for the two foreign ministers’ visit because, among other things, it saw that Greece could help lift the stalemate in Bethlehem. The problem of the Nativity Church directly concerns the Jerusalem Patriarchate and, by extension, Greek interests. The situation is extremely delicate as, for the first time ever, the church has been occupied and besieged. Many of the Palestinians who have taken refuge in the church are armed, while Muslim clerics are conducting services there. There is no doubt that this sacred place is not only being used as a sanctuary, but also as a political weapon. The Patriarchate wants at all costs to avert a military intervention which would unavoidably result in a bloodbath and turn what is a Christian symbol into a memorial for the Palestinian resistance. The Israelis want to avoid the political cost of such an act, but have said that the occupants must either surrender or leave Palestine. Arafat has rejected this, thereby extending the stalemate. About 10 days ago, Greece’s Secretary-General for Overseas Greeks, Dimitris Dolis, went to Jerusalem, accompanied by the foreign minister’s associate Alex Rondos, to try and resolve the issue. They attended a meeting with Greek Orthodox Patriarch Irenaios and the patriarchs of the Franciscans and the Armenians, who for centuries have been responsible for guarding the church. In a letter to Sharon and Arafat, the three patriarchs called for the removal of the bodies in the church and for a peaceful solution to be found. Last week, Papandreou briefed participants at the EU-Mediterranean summit in Valencia on the issue. On Monday evening, in fact, he met with the Turkish foreign minister to discuss their visit. Among other things, it was decided to focus on the problem of the church. They raised the issue with Arafat, who authorized Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekaat, and with Sharon, who in turn delegated his adviser Danny Ayalon, already in contact with Dolis, to deal with the issue. The result was a marathon effort to allow Erekaat to visit Tel Aviv and meet with the two ministers. Greece’s energetic consul general in Jerusalem went to Jericho in his embassy car and the visit took place, no doubt raising the profile of Greek diplomacy in the eyes of Palestinians and on the international scene. The climate was favorable for an agreement to remove two bodies from the church and to allow a group of teenagers to leave. According to the Greek minister, prospects look good for a comprehensive solution to the problem in Bethlehem. The two ministers were under no illusions over their ability to significantly influence developments. Papandreou placed much emphasis on the political symbolism, on the fact that Ankara and Athens, despite their differences, found a way not only to talk but to take joint initiatives. It was a message to the two warring sides to resume the peace process. True to his word, Papandreou had taken two olive trees to plant with Cem. In a more practical vein, Papandreou’s Turkish counterpart put more emphasis on fighting terrorism. However, without managing to convince the Israelis, he did manage to spoil the impression that Papandreou had been trying to cultivate among the Greek public with regard to their joint initiative. The olive trees never got planted in Palestine but were left in the back of the bus taking journalists to the airport, and were given to the bus driver. Their somewhat inglorious fate is better understood if one relates it to the way the Israelis embarrassed the Greek and Turkish delegations on their departure from Arafat’s headquarters. The two ministers’ cars were allowed to leave for the meeting with Sharon, but the delegations were kept waiting for about 20 minutes with the terse explanation that the officials were awaiting orders. During that time, a tank moved around the delegations, churning up dust. When the delegations finally arrived, late and dusty, at the prime minister’s residence, the security guards did not let them in. Their chairs at the talks remained unoccupied. If nothing else, if the comrades on the PASOK Executive Bureau had known these details, their vitriolic comments would have taken on yet another hue.
