These are on three levels – personal, organizational and operational. a) Personal The militants’ personal lives have to be completely subjected to the demands of the organization. They must be discreet. Not even their closest relatives or a spouse can be aware of what they are involved in. When they are required to be away for a few days, they have to invent a cover story, even if these absences are frequent. On the job, their clothing, behavior and various personal preferences or habits (such as cigarette brand, newspaper, wristwatch, hairstyle) have to match their cover. If they choose an object to be identified by, it has to be something other than simply a newspaper, which anyone might be holding, or a very common brand of cigarettes. Every morning, they should look around at the faces of people in the street, in order to check for informers or anything out of the ordinary in their neighborhood, such as street vendors or vehicles. Militants should avoid places watched by police or where police might appear at any minute, such as shooting galleries or red-light districts. They should also keep away from leftist and progressive groups, other people active in politics, or even places where these people meet. If possible, they should make contact with reactionary groups, but should report these meetings to their immediate superiors in the organization. They must never carry incriminating papers unless on a special mission, nor should they write anything on notepaper or cigarette packets. They should avoid public gatherings, road accidents and fights. They should never take a taxi while on a mission, while those already wanted by police should not drive and, in general, should observe stricter safety precautions and be particularly vigilant. If their part in a mission requires them to be in one of these places, they must provide themselves with a cover and not stay there any longer than necessary. b) Organizational Once the organization begins a job, it must have reserves of contacts, material and people, ensuring a continual turnover among these reserves. The main rule is the isolation of all sectors of the organization. When members meet, according to the importance of the meeting, the following security measures should be taken: – Comrades at the meeting should have a cover. – They must not all arrive at the same time. – They must not all use the same route. – There should be a password, even if the coast is clear. – There should be a cover for every person in the house. – One person should do the talking if police or unknown persons enter the house. – There should be plans for escape, destruction of papers, concealment, destruction or removal of material, and scouts to cover the escape route. – There should be comrades outside the house to keep watch and to be able to inform those inside. – Those on watch may be armed, or there may be a second, larger watch being kept, armed or otherwise. – Roads or the area around the house should be booby-trapped. – There should be a plan to resist arrest, or for those on watch to distract police. The members also need to have an idea of what police will do in specific circumstances so as to keep them on the defensive, rather than the offensive. In roadblocks, police have the advantage of surprise and organized attack. If this is foreseen, then the terrorists have the advantage of surprise. When a member is arrested, the other members who are in contact with him or her must immediately be told to go into hiding, and places he or she has frequented must be be abandoned (homes, workplaces). If released, those arrested must be watched in case they have become informers. There must be an analysis of the causes of the arrest (this could also lead to the discovery of an informer) and of the reasons for the release. If an informer is discovered and punished, the other members should know that after failing to contact the police once or twice, the police will attack immediately in order to make use of the information already received. c) Operational The nucleus carrying out an operation is isolated in that it does not share the work with others. For example, when a comrade is charged with observing police movements in an area, he or she should not know if or when there is to be a mission in that area. The leader of the nucleus is to gather the group together 24 hours (more or less, according to the circumstances) beforehand and explain the mission in detail. Then the plan can be debated. The members cannot leave but must stay together until the mission is carried out. When it is in progress, there is to be another group whose job it is to protect their comrades carrying out the mission. There must be signs (gestures, various sounds) for communication and coordination between members of the group. There must be information about the police in the area, the possible routes they may take and the time needed for them to arrive. There should be a plan for a speedy and safe escape, a meeting point (if necessary) and a cover for everyone involved. Finally, the members of the mission should have an alibi for that day, but if a safe one cannot be found, none should be used. Militants should be systematically briefed on the importance of these security measures; police methods against revolutionary groups should be explained as well as the need to view these precautions as a weapon. The higher the level of political awareness, the easier it is to comprehend these rules. Everyone should be aware that these measures are only a means to an end. A rule can be broken if it becomes an obstacle.