Ukraine war: Gains and losses for Greece
The Putin regime’s irrational decision to attack Ukraine has radically changed Europe’s security architecture. NATO has switched back to its primary mission of countering the Russian threat, while the United States has returned to the Old Continent with the aim of counterbalancing Russia’s military superiority. The European Union is meanwhile building up its military capability in the pursuit of strategic autonomy and Germany is, for the same reason, investing in its armed forces. Meanwhile, Greece has registered gains and losses that must be noted.
During the Cold War, Greece’s geostrategic value was indisputable but it still fell short of Turkey’s as the country bordered on the Soviet Union. For the first time in many decades, Greece is viewed as key in containing Russian aggression. The ambivalence of the Turkish leadership toward Moscow has played a decisive role in this. Valuable assistance reaches Ukraine, and other NATO countries in the Balkans, through Greek territory.
Bypassing the Bosporus Strait undermines Turkey’s role as a guardian of Western interests in the Black Sea. Currently, Romania serves as NATO’s frontline state in the region. For this reason, the further strengthening of relations with Bucharest must be a priority for Greek diplomacy. Day by day, a strategic corridor is being built from Greece’s northern port of Alexandroupoli to the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanta and the Ukrainian port city of Odesa. The war in Ukraine has offered Greece a unique role; it must utilize it wisely and decisively.
The war has negatively affected Greece in two major ways: First, Greek-Russian relations are at a low point – which is foremostly Moscow’s fault. Russia’s propaganda campaign in Greece should be of concern because it was well planned. On the other hand, sending weapons to Ukraine was a bold decision that created an insurmountable chasm with Moscow. Despite the suffocating conditions created by the war, it is in the national interest of Athens to maintain channels of communication with Russian society. Secondly, ethnic Greeks living along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov in southeastern Ukraine have suffered a major blow. Despite the efforts of the Greek Foreign Ministry, the diaspora community is fragmented and threatened with extinction. Athens must support expatriates with all available means, no matter which side of the border they find themselves on. This is a moral duty that the Greek government must begin to fulfill, without further delay.
Currently, Romania serves as NATO’s frontline state in the region. For this reason, the further strengthening of relations with Bucharest must be a priority for Greek diplomacy
The big question is what’s next. The war will continue until one of the two sides wins, or until the cost of operations becomes exorbitant for both sides. However, the confrontation between the West and Putin’s regime will continue and possibly escalate. Athens has no choice but to systematically promote itself as a reliable US ally in the region. Only in this way will Greece find a sympathetic ear for its claims in Washington.
Although it would be premature to draw any conclusions, the massive earthquakes in Turkey and Greek humanitarian aid have helped to ease tensions. It will soon become clear whether an opportunity lies here for a partial normalization of Greek-Turkish relations. In any case, any ideas for a joint exploitation of energy resources are based on the misconception that politics follows economics. This is not confirmed by a review of bilateral conflicts outside Europe. Greece is, obviously, not France and Turkey is not Germany.
In any case, Greek foreign policy is no longer held to ransom by the rivalry with Turkey. Greece is evolving into a major defense and energy hub between three continents. We are gradually winning the respect of friends and foes. However, there is no room for complacency and failures. We have entered a new period of uncertainty and insecurity. The Melian Dialogue must be our guide in the decade unfolding: “right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides, “The Peloponnesian War,” The Melian Dialogue, Book 5, Chapter 17). This is, ultimately, the biggest lesson to be drawn from the war in Ukraine.
Manos Karagiannis is professor of international relations at the University of Macedonia and reader in international security at King’s College London. His book “Prevention and Defense” was recently released by the Papadopoulos Publishing Company.
