Uneven pressure on PASOK
The pressure on the socialist PASOK opposition to reveal what party it would cooperate with in order to form a government after the next elections is not simply premature – it is unfair and suspicious. Why are other parties not subjected to the same relentless questioning? Why is no other political force – even those that have suddenly surged in the polls and claim to be competing with PASOK – asked to respond to hypothetical scenarios based on information that is currently unavailable?
There appears to be a kind of frantic insistence directed uniquely at PASOK to spell out its intentions. The demand is not unreasonable in itself; parties should indeed speak plainly about their plans. But the one-sided zeal is puzzling, given how much may change before the moment of substantive decisions arrives, and how many actors besides PASOK will ultimately be called upon to make those decisions. After all, why should PASOK be expected to know now whether it will cooperate with former prime minister Alexis Tsipras (who, at the moment, is not even an MP), while Tsipras himself is not expected to disclose – to the very same people asking whether PASOK will work with him – if, when, and with whom he plans to form a new party?
Seriousness as a curse
One reason PASOK is saddled with the burden of political futurology is its stereotypical reputation as a serious opposition party. It is not easy to pose uncomfortable questions to politicians who might call you a “child of the junta,” storm out of the TV studio if displeased, or reply with a stream of words bearing no relation to the question asked. Those who conduct politics with moderation are, therefore, inevitably the ones expected to provide difficult answers. Another reason is the pivotal role PASOK will inevitably play after the elections: If it becomes common ground among the parties that the “Mitsotakis regime must fall,” then attention will naturally shift to the next strongest pole to offer a solution to the challenge of forming a government. This is something PASOK should have anticipated – which makes its inadequate preparation all the more unjustifiable. The party may indeed be targeted unfairly, but that does not absolve it of the obligation to formulate clear positions. The political balance of 2027 cannot be foreseen. Consequently, no serious party can credibly claim today to know exactly how it will act then; it can, however, articulate how it will not act: where it sets its boundaries, what it categorically excludes, whom it rejects without caveats. Red lines are not matters of circumstance but matters of principle.
Self-definition
The awkward grumbling provoked by Thessaloniki MP Rania Thraskia’s remark that PASOK could consider Tsipras a potential interlocutor stems not from the remark itself, but from the broader internal uncertainty it exposes. If PASOK kept its doors firmly shut to those who previously attacked it, the MP would not be speaking so generously about her party’s possible alliances; indeed, she would not have had the luxury of migrating from SYRIZA to PASOK in the first place.
Conversely, if PASOK kept its doors wide open, the discussion around coalition prospects would not have caused such turmoil; it would be taken for granted that PASOK is seeking alliances – perhaps not of the highest caliber – and the matter would end there. It is this tendency of keeping the door half-open, half-closed that betrays PASOK’s political and ideological confusion and leaves the party exposed. It may be understandable that PASOK does not yet know the arithmetic of its future governing proposal, but it is far harder to understand why it still does not know with whom it is ideologically aligned and with whom it is not – who fits its identity and history, and who is entirely incompatible. There is a way to stop the tiresome questions directed at PASOK: to have a satisfactory answer ready before those questions arise.
