Turkish bartering over Cyprus to cover eventualities
The agreement between Brussels and Ankara on the content of the protocol for a customs union with Cyprus, reached after protracted negotiations, has confirmed that from the very beginning Turkey sought ways to turn what it saw as a potentially unfavorable development into an opportunity to improve its position. What is yet to emerge is the precise contents of the protocol, whether it discriminates against Cyprus in any way and most important of all, when it will go into effect. At first sight the current state of affairs seems to have put Turkey in a difficult position, since signing the protocol was tantamount to indirect recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. However, there is every indication that Ankara had carefully planned its moves. First of all, it requested that at the same time as the protocol was signed, a supplementary declaration would be included to the effect that its action did not constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. The European Union, either for reasons of principle or in an attempt to reflect the lingering skepticism about Turkey which is widespread in some member countries, made it clear that this request could not be met. Alternative solution A second alternative was therefore suggested. The protocol would be signed, but its ratification by the National Assembly and its subsequent implementation would occur sometime after October 3. Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos let it be understood that such an outcome would not be acceptable, and that Cyprus might interrupt Turkey’s progress toward the opening of accession talks with the EU. If it is hard for a small country like Cyprus to cast a single veto, then two vetos on its part are probably out of the question. Turkey is simultaneously pushing for approval of the regulations for direct trade with the occupied part of Cyprus. The Cypriot government, and the Greek government so far, have expressed their disagreement with the contents of those regulations, as they believe they would imply de facto recognition of the breakaway state in northern Cyprus. That is exactly how Turkey perceives it, and will present its approval as a success attained in exchange for signing the protocol. Well-prepared for all eventualities, Turkish diplomacy had another scenario up its sleeve. On April 17, Turkish Cypriots will hold elections for a new leader. In all probability the winner will be Mehmet Ali Talat, said to be pro-European and conciliatory. New initiative Immediately after the polls, Ankara wants to see an initiative by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that would have the following results: Either Nicosia will reject the initiative (if it is expressed in a way that is not acceptable to the Cypriot government, for instance by imposing an adjudicator or rejecting basic changes to the original plan), in which case the Turkish leadership will be entitled to adopt a much tougher stance; Or a negotiation process will be set in train that will end after October 3, at which point Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be entitled to asked for a brief postponement in the implementation of the protocol’s provisions in expectation of a solution. Meanwhile, he will have demonstrated good will by having gone through the formality of signing the EU document. Open fronts Until then, whoever wants to will be able to exert pressure on Greece to admonish Papadopoulos, while keeping open other fronts in our foreign policy that need swift solutions, such as FYROM and problems in the Aegean. But can Greece simultaneously support a supposedly negative Cypriot president, block the regulations, hinder FYROM’s European path and manage problematic Greek-Turkish relations all at once?
