Greece-Turkey: Rules, compromises, concessions
No one chooses their geographical neighbors. That is why it is essential to find rules for living with them, such as:
Rule number one: A country like Greece must have a high-level, long-term strategy for dealing with a neighbor that often provokes, and claims territories and seas – a strategy that must be combined with the country’s values and interests. The country must aim for peaceful coexistence and to solve problems when and if possible, but it must also be able to meet any challenge by every means possible.
Rule number two: Any compromise must be beneficial to both sides. We talk, and, when necessary and possible, we negotiate with our neighbor. We never announce concessions in advance, nor do we hide them under the carpet, because the other side will take them for granted from the outset. And by extension, during the course of the negotiations, it will demand more. From this point of view, by announcing concessions and, even worse, by announcing a loss of sovereignty, which should not even have been put on the table, the prime minister has made a historic mistake.
Rule number three: A general policy option (debate, negotiation, compromise) is not in its overall formulation wrong or right. It becomes wrong or right by the context in which it is made, and the terms and conditions of its implementation. For example, referring the Greek-Turkish disputes to an international court (preferably that in The Hague) is not wrong or right in itself. It is wrong if it is done without conditions and preparation. And this is where the mistakes and shortcomings of the current government lie.
Before seeing the ‘good’ of a negotiation and an agreement, you do not give up, not even in words, your weapons, both legal and defensive
For the country to go to The Hague, it must have made proper preparation. It should study all the decisions of the court as well as the publications of the judges’ staff, and the statements of the judges themselves. Also, it must have set its own house in order, including closing all the bays (which produce sovereignty), as well as extending territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in all areas outside diplomatic scrutiny. At the same time, the country must open up international channels to avoid the interests and views of third countries wanting to transit seas in which the country exercises sovereignty – and not just sovereign rights, as is the case with the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) – from getting involved in the issue.
As far as the EEZs are concerned, one can now be sure that the court will take into account the multiple concessions made by the Greek government in accepting all the demands of Italy and Egypt – concessions that will also be requested by Turkey. Moreover, I believe it is likely that, soon, there will be an agreement between Egypt and Turkey on their EEZs, which may well include the part of the sea that the Mitsotakis government wrongly made sure was left out of the Greek-Egyptian agreement.
Moreover, it seems that the prime minister has agreed that Greece will not extend any zone without Turkey’s agreement. If this is true, it means that he has abandoned the policy line of there being no other dispute with Turkey beyond the EEZ/continental shelf. And not only did he officially add another dispute, but he gave Turkey a say in other Greek zones, and not just maritime ones.
Rule number four: Turkey must commit to comply with all the provisions of international law. It must fully accept the jurisdiction and decisions of the International Court of Justice. In other words, it must ratify the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Otherwise, how can we trust it to respect the results of such an appeal? Let’s not forget the constant violations of UN resolutions on the Cyprus issue.
Once Turkey has ratified the UNCLOS, it should immediately withdraw its casus belli. Otherwise, how are we going to go to court? Under threat? And what if Turkey does not approve of any decision?
Rule number five: When in an agreement with a neighbor, you cut off any intention of irredentism. In the case of the Prespes Agreement, North Macedonia gave up from the very start any geographic-territorial population-based irredentism and was forced to give up all “modern” tautological, historical-cultural irredentism as well. In the Prespes Agreement, in Paragraph 7, North Macedonia bindingly acknowledged that the country and its populations have no relation to ancient Greek history or Alexander the Great’s Macedonia, which was and still is Greek. Unfortunately, in our relations with Turkey, the prime minister has done exactly the opposite. He announced that our differences would shift from the field of law to that of geopolitics. In doing so, he brought us back to the irredentism of the 19th century.
Rule number six: Before seeing the “good” of a negotiation and an agreement, you do not give up, not even in words, your weapons, both legal and defensive. The bad news is that the prime minister agreed to talk about the demilitarization of Greek islands with 40% of the Cypriot territory under Turkish occupation. Not remembering what happened when the Greek brigade withdrew from Cyprus. That is why I maintain that there are many kinds of compromises. There are positive, creative ones, as well as tactical, temporary, respite ones, but there are also – and everything indicates that we are dealing with one of them here – rotten, misguided compromises.
Rule number seven: We must never mix issues to justify unnecessary concessions. The New Democracy party, with the consent of part of SYRIZA, claims that the prime minister is preparing “the Prespes of the Aegean.” I wonder, if Prespes was a “betrayal,” how can the prime minister have a similar goal in Greek-Turkish relations? But let’s assume that the prime minister now accepts that Prespes was an excellent agreement, as he states in his international meetings, might it then be time to implement it as well as its accompanying agreements? Most importantly, it is an insult to the Prespes Agreement to invoke it in order to justify the government’s poor preparation of a flawed compromise. Let me explain:
First, the Prespes Agreement set all the conditions to put a headstone on irredentism. Such a thing not only does not occur with the “a la Mitsotakis geopolitical shifting” of Greek-Turkish relations, but it is being widely reproduced.
Secondly, with the Prespes Agreement, Greece undertook to support, and to some extent control and train the neighbor’s defense mechanisms. On the contrary, what the prime minister is preparing envisages the disarmament of part of Greece at the request of Turkey.
Thirdly, North Macedonia as a name and constitutional status came about through changes bindingly provided for in the Prespes Agreement, in exchange for facilitating its accession to the EU. The question is what exactly will Greece get from Turkey? The prime minister and his staff argue that taking Turkey to the International Court of Justice is a retreat on its part. This is not the case, especially without the conditions I have set. Moreover, unlike what happened with North Macedonia, the New Democracy government accepted the renaming of a big part of the Aegean Sea as Turkagean…
Finally, while Greece and North Macedonia made mutually sound compromises that benefited and brought gains to both sides, in what the prime minister has announced, the gains are largely accumulated unilaterally in Turkey.
The question is why is this happening? Maybe because certain people in the government do not understand the long-term consequences for the country and want to please third parties? Maybe because some are abandoning the option of equal membership in the EU and are gearing up to become Turkey’s small partner? Or, finally, could it be because some business interests are being served?
Nikos Kotzias is a former minister of foreign affairs.
