The war in Gaza and Greek-Turkish relations: Erdogan’s balancing act
A much-discussed question in Greece these days is: What impact is the war in Gaza having on Greek-Turkish relations? The good – and at first glance perhaps surprising – answer is that the war has not yet had any negative impact on bilateral relations, and it can be assumed that this will remain the case.
The roadmap agreed by Athens and Ankara, which is due to reach a preliminary climax with a new summit meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kyriakos Mitsotakis at the beginning of December, is proceeding smoothly. Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis recently praised the “exceptionally productive climate” of relations. Turkish diplomats are similarly positive.
Everything indicates that Athens and Ankara are interested in shielding the bilateral process of rapprochement from the turbulence of the war in their neighborhood. Whether this plan will last in the long term depends on several variables – above all the attitude, or one could even say the whims, of the Turkish president.
The past teaches us that Erdogan can make radical political changes in a short space of time. We have seen that volatility in Ankara’s policy towards Greece. While Mitsotakis was considered “persona non grata” for the Turkish president not so long ago, the “Mitsotakis yok” has now given way to constructive dialogue. Ankara’s Middle East policy is also anything but consistent. These days, we are witnessing a return to the radical rhetoric of the “Arab Spring,” when Erdogan became an advocate of the popular uprisings.
The demonstrative closing of ranks with the Islamists led to a break with the autocratic rulers in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Athens took advantage of Ankara’s diplomatic marginalization in the Arab world to put its own relations in this part of the world on a new strategic footing – where they remain to this day.
In 2020, Erdogan tried to regain lost diplomatic ground with a so-called charm offensive. This also included the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel, which took place in August last year. Just a few weeks ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Erdogan met in person for the first time. There was talk of a springtime in Israeli-Turkish relations. However, the spirit of optimism ended abruptly with the war over Gaza: “Netanyahu is not someone we can talk to, we have written him off,” Erdogan announced recently.
The next few weeks will show whether Erdogan will repeat his mistake of 2011 and antagonize the moderate Arabs, including the Saudis and Egyptians, by moving too close to the Islamists.
It is striking that Erdogan’s insults against the West and Israel do not correspond to political practice. At the height of the crisis, Erdogan gave his approval for Sweden to join NATO. Although Ankara recalled its ambassador from Israel, it did not break off the diplomatic relations that had only just been established: “The complete severance of diplomatic relations is not possible, especially in international diplomacy,” Erdogan justified his restraint.
These are the words of a pragmatist who knows full well that there will be a day after, and that Israel will continue to play a key role in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is this pragmatism that currently determines Erdogan’s policy towards Greece. Good relations with Athens are a bridge to the European Union for Ankara. Erdogan does not want to destroy this bridge, not at least for economic reasons. This is a bargaining chip that Greek diplomacy should handle with care.
Dr Ronald Meinardus is a senior research fellow and the coordinator of research projects on Greek-German relations at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
