The Beleri case and Balkan policy
The situation in some parts of the Western Balkans is volatile and problematic in the rest. Prospects of joining the European Union have faded and the fresh momentum stemming chiefly from Ukraine but also from Moldova in the shadow of the Moscow-Kiev war has stumbled on the unwillingness of certain member-states in the union to accelerate enlargement, as well as on the inability of national governments to carry out reforms bringing their country’s system up to EU standards. I remember being in Washington, DC, a year ago, and hearing the cry of despair from North Macedonia’s then-foreign minister, Nikola Dimitrov, concerning the grave consequences on the Western Balkans’ stability and democratization if their citizens began to lose faith in EU intentions for enlargement.
Greek policy has perforce entered a new cycle 20 years after the first EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Thessaloniki, so it is essential that we formulate a comprehensive rather than piecemeal approach. Greece has serious unfinished business with Albania because of the case of Fredi Beleri (the jailed ethnic-Greek mayor-elect of Himare), while we are also stalling over the implementation of the terms agreed with North Macedonia, losing precious time, given that the upcoming elections in the neighboring country are likely to see the resurgence of the nationalist VMRO, which opposes the Prespes name deal with Greece.
Concerning Albania, we naturally have an obligation to secure the best possible future for the ethnic-Greek minority by using its EU aspirations to exert effective pressure with respect to the rule of law. It is unfortunate, however, that the original Greek position was to challenge the Albanian judicial system instead of insisting that the newly elected mayor should be allowed to take his oath of office. The situation has reached a point where Greece cannot retreat, not just on the Beleri case, but also on other outstanding matters, such as property ownership issues, the law on self-determination, as well as the demarcation of an exclusive economic zone, over which the Albanian government is dragging his heels. If it does, this would stoke Albanian nationalism at the expense of a positive outlook in relations between the two countries. As for Beleri, the conclusion of this affair, either way, will send the message to the EU and the region that our country is capable of exercising effective policy and defending its well-meaning interests. If Albanian membership prospects remain undisturbed without the Beleri issue being resolved (it is good that the process has become more politicized and reversible since 2020), this will embolden Tirana to take advantage of the situation with regard to the resolution, or non-resolution of the mentioned matters mentioned above. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama is betting on emerging as the natural leader of the region’s entire Albanian population, to win the favor of leaders like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, but also that of the United States. He believes that in this way he can neutralize any pressure Athens might seek to exert on him by using Albania’s induction into the EU as leverage.
Beyond that, Greece has no say in the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, it backs the European position on the Bosnian issue and even though Greek business activity is making a dynamic comeback in the region, this still needs to be combined with diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving bilateral disputes, as well as participation in multilateral partnerships through which Greece can, in the long term, lay the foundations of a Balkan pact for peace, cooperation and development. The goal of such an initiative would be to maintain the legal acquis, independent of changes in government. Athens can and must become more active in the region, starting with a Balkan tour by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and a delegation of government officials and businesspeople. It would also be good if Greece were to finalize its position concerning EU expansion by 2033 in the form of a roadmap that the prime minister could present to his Balkan counterparts. This Athens-brokered road map could also be drawn up after the tour, once the prime minister has heard what the other leaders of the region have to say. This would not be a substitute to EU policy or an attempt to preempt Brussels. Any such effort would be doomed to fail. But this roadmap could serve to prioritize the issues and institute an ongoing dialogue among the states of the region, both at the highest and lower levels, between politicians, business leaders and cultural figures, and certainly with members of the new generation.
The international turbulence and the instability prevailing in and around the Balkans allow, if not demand, initiatives for the creation of a Balkan regional council that could become a mechanism for exchanging good practices and managing, or even settling, issues concerning day-to-day life and the common challenges facing the region as a whole, leaving the management of major issues to the EU and NATO. In this way, joint development cooperation strategies could be developed, with Thessaloniki at the center of these processes. A further asset for Greece is the country’s leading role in the energy interconnection of the Western Balkans with suppliers and markets.
Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of the ACG Institute of Global Affairs.
