Cold shoulder, hot opportunity
Judging by the disappointment of Greece’s political and diplomatic establishment, President Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey looks like a diplomatic triumph for our neighbor and perennial rival. It is obvious that the fixed relationship between Washington, Athens and Ankara – exemplified by the 7:10 ratio agreement, which meant that for every 10 dollars in aid that Turkey got, Greece would get 7 – has been broken. Washington has made no effort to hide the fact that it does not consider Athens important enough to burden Obama with an unnecessary visit simply for the sake of appearances. This realpolitik has reached the point where – inexplicably – even the wise, respected and moderate spiritual head of the world’s Orthodox Christians, Ecumenical Patriarch Vartholomaios, has been left off the agenda for Obama’s visit. As much as this may hurt Greeks’ and Greek Cypriots’ sense of justice, they cannot expect a president who has shown that he has no scruples about overturning decades of domestic and international policy to spend any time worrying about another country’s sensitivities. And Obama does not need a visit that could provoke the kind of street theatrics that made Greece look as if it was being burned to the ground when President Clinton visited in 1999. It is difficult to face the fact that Greece is more or less irrelevant to developments in the wider region. But if we want to step back from an emotional reading of the situation, we might see that things are not all that bad for Greece. The chief benefit of Obama’s cold shoulder is that it gives Greeks the opportunity to rid themselves of the delusion that all they need to do to solve their problems is to grouse enough so that Washington takes their side. It should have been clear since Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 that Washington’s studied neutrality would never work to Athens’s benefit. The Macedonia name issue proved this beyond doubt. Greece must now understand that it has to stand on its own and use its diplomatic and political initiatives to function as a valuable member of the European Union. Only if Greece becomes self-confident and self-reliant will it be able to turn events to its advantage, whether this be in relation to Ankara, Skopje, Moscow, Brussels or Washington. It was such self-confidence that allowed Turkey to block US plans to invade northern Iraq from its territory, yet keep relations with Washington alive. But the most important legacy of Obama’s visit to Turkey will be the extent to which the United States is prepared to press «a key NATO ally» to go against its own interests in order to serve Washington’s strategies. Obama’s greatest concerns on his visit to Turkey – behind the obvious window dressing of his participation in a meeting aimed at promoting dialogue between the West and Muslim countries – are Washington’s exit strategy from Iraq, the containment of Iran and renewed international involvement in Afghanistan. For this reason, issues such as Kurdish rights and aspirations, both in Turkey and Iraq, recognition of the Ottoman Empire’s genocidal campaign against the Armenians, Cyprus and the Patriarchate are likely to be mentioned in a way that will save face for both sides but not get in the way of what Washington considers the real issues. Now Greece must take stock of its own long-term interests, plan its strategy and get involved in regional and European developments. Turkey’s relationship with the United States is indeed more intense right now, but this could serve as a catalyst that will increase the terrible tension between Turkey’s ruthless secular state and an Islamist government already wounded by unexpected losses in the local elections of March 29.
