Prospects for Greek-Turkish relations to emerge clearly by spring
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to have “less of an appetite for tensions with Greece,” according to Ryan Gingeras, a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in California, in an interview with Kathimerini.
His commentary titled “Why Erdogan might choose war with Greece,” published in October 2022, ignited discussions in decision-making centers in Washington. Over a year later, Gingeras expresses surprise at the current state of relations between the two countries but believes that the positive climate could be disrupted if Erdogan decides so.
Gingeras anticipates that the next few months will provide a clearer understanding of the situation as the true intentions of both countries become apparent. Referring to the close relations between the US and Greece, he emphasizes that these ties are evolving independently of Greek-Turkish tensions.
In October 2022, you described the conflict between Greece and Turkey as not just “possible but probable.” Today we are in the midst of a de-escalation phase. What are the prospects moving forward?
I think we’ll know more by spring. I think by then, it will be clearer how both sides plan to address the more serious issues that separate the two sides. Structurally they could continue to kick the can down the road, with working groups and talks. My sense is that Ankara may have less of an appetite for tensions with Greece than it has had in the past two years given other serious issues it is dealing with. But that can change quickly depending on Erdogan’s own perceptions and interests.
Do you think that the increased US presence in Greece, coupled with the strengthened cooperation between Athens and Washington, may have played a role in acting as a deterrent for Turkey? Did those factors perhaps affect Erdogan’s way of thinking and calculations?
I don’t think the US attempted to warn Turkey of anything. I think that the US cooperation with Greece is inspired by interests independent of Greek-Turkish tensions. Ankara may see this cooperation as a threat or an attempt at thwarting further aggression, but the US-Greek relationship is not that by design.
What factors might endanger the positive dynamic in this new phase of the Greece-Turkey relations?
I’m not sure. If the F-16 sale to Turkey issue remains unresolved while Washington finalizes the transfer of F-35s to Greece, that may stir things up.
Do you think that this improvement in the relations can last?
In the long term, I’m pessimistic. But I have to say I’m surprised we are where we are right now in Turkish-Greek relations. My expectations now are pretty open-ended, at least in the near term.
Besides the substantial bilateral relations that remain unsettled, how might regional issues – like Turkey’s insistence on two states on Cyprus or Turkey’s hostility towards Greece’s Eastern Mediterranean partners (specifically Israel) – derail any rapprochement and revive tensions?
It’s clear Erdogan has gone out of his way to keep the de-escalation process going. As I said before, I think it will be his decision to keep it going perhaps despite signs of strain in Cyprus or other such issues.
