Keeping Turks in fold

French and Dutch votes could herald review of US relations with Ankara

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan chairs the annual meeting of the High Military Council in Ankara last August. Erdogan yesterday set off for Washington on a fence-mending visit.

By Burak Bekdil - Kathimerini English Edition

Never mind that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul says the French “non” and subsequent Dutch “nee” for the proposed European Constitution have nothing to do with the prospect of eventual Turkish membership. The truth is — as this columnist is certain Gul is fully aware — the rejection of the new constitution by the EU’s two founding members will not only have a major in-house impact, but will also weaken Turkey’s future attachment to the club it desperately wants to join.

Such are things at a time when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has a very important rendezvous at the White House. Once again, and perhaps for the last time, Turkey’s five-decade-long Western ally will come to its aid only to keep the unpredictable Turkey “anchored at a Western bay.”

After several ups and downs in the increasingly problematic relationship between Ankara and Washington, President George W. Bush will probably assure Erdogan that even should Turkey’s bid to join Europe’s elite group of states fail, it should still look westward, and across the Atlantic, for a Western attachment.

The neo-conservatives in Washington are not only cheered by the French and Dutch vote results, but see their repercussions as an opportunity to “renegotiate the US partnership with Turkey.” For example, according to Michael Rubin, a Turkey and Middle East specialist with the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute, the Europeans will “humiliate Turkey.”

The Americans are aware of the gloomy prospects for Turkey’s EU bid. Also, they are aware that in the event of any break with the EU, the unpredictable Turkey may seek bizarre alliances “east and northward,” a scenario that hardly complies with American plans for the Middle East and the Caucasus.

The American ideologues are quite right in fearing that should Turkey’s EU vision fade and the EU leave Turkey out in the cold, Ankara, with already rising nationalist sentiment, might turn into a loose cannon, a dangerous failed state in the backyard of the EU and possibly America.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice laid the grounds for this emerging policy on Turkey when she said, “What we cannot afford to have is a divide between Turkey and the rest of Europe that might look like what was once described as a clash of civilizations between Muslim Turkey and multireligious but Christian Europe.” That, according to the neo-conservatives, is essential. Turkey must remain anchored to the West when it feels insecure over its future.

Ironically, Erdogan’s Washington visit comes as Turkey’s relations with the United States are deteriorating over Iraq, the future of the Middle East and rising anti-American sentiment among Turks. Inevitably, there will be much American-bashing behind closed doors in Washington, but the potential implications of alarming developments on the Ankara-Brussels axis should precede other matters in the Bush-Erdogan meeting.

Turkey’s potential EU troubles are not limited to the French and Dutch referendums. In a further blow, Germany’s early elections in September may reverse Berlin’s support for Turkish entry. Angela Merkel, the opposition Christian Democrat leader, is a staunch opponent of the idea of 80 million Turks as EU members.

In addition, two key backers of Turkey’s case, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi, look more like lame ducks than confident leaders in their countries, where Turkey’s EU entry is not popular.

No doubt, it is too early to predict any eventual European “yes/no” to Turkey. By the time the EU must finally decide on Turkish membership, Frau Merkel will probably have ended her political career, and the French and Dutch referendums shall already have been forgotten. All the same, it is also true that the referendums and the German elections, per se, are bad news for the Turkish candidacy.

Turkey’s timetable for accession is between 10 and 15 years. During that period, no doubt, most of the present-day dynamics will change in one direction or another. Nevertheless, judging from the present-day parameters, it would not be wrong to predict a “third way” as an alternative to a “yes” (Crescent and Star in the EU) and a “no” (Crescent and Star as a loose cannon on the EU’s doorstep). The third way could be a Turkey strongly attached to the EU under a privileged partnership accord, and even more strongly anchored to the United States. In any case, it would be wise for Turkey to disregard the turmoil in Europe sparked by the referendums and focus on implementing the reforms necessary to join the bloc, and making the country a better place in which to live.