Arms diplomacy in the crossfire: The geopolitical chessboard of F-16s, F-35s, and Sweden’s NATO bid
Since President Erdogan agreed in principle to enlargement at the NATO summit in Vilnius last July, we have witnessed a political back-and-forth on the Swedish issue reminiscent of the hustle and bustle of an oriental bazaar.
It is no longer about the Scandinavian country; Ankara is employing its veto power as a bargaining chip in the struggle for arms supplies from the US. Specifically, it concerns the procurement of 40 ultra-modern F-16 fighter jets and 80 modernization packages for outdated aircraft in the Turkish arsenal.
Despite initial hesitation, the Biden administration favors the arms deal with the Turks, yet the transaction faces bipartisan opposition in both houses of Congress.
“The United States’ positive stance on the F-16 issue will accelerate our parliament’s favorable view (on Swedish membership),” the Turkish president articulated. “All of these are interlinked,” Erdogan added.
President Biden formally informed Congress in February of last year of his intention to deliver the F-16 package to Ankara. Opposition swiftly formed in Congress, with critics of the arms deal citing Ankara’s perceived lack of loyalty to the alliance in the Ukraine conflict. They also established a political link between Turkey’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO membership and approval of the arms deliveries. A third demand from Congress, further complicating the process, aims to ensure that Ankara does not deploy the delivered aircraft against NATO partner Greece.
Washington’s relations with Turkey have long carried a Greek dimension, particularly in arms procurements, dating back to Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus 50 years ago and the ensuing arms embargo. Notably, a well-established Hellenic lobby has ensured that the Administration remains vigilant about arms deals in the region, safeguarding Athens’ interests.
The Hellenic Air Force is keen on acquiring modern aircraft “Made in the USA,” with ongoing discussions centered on the potential acquisition of up to 48 F-35s — fighter jets considered by experts as the epitome of weapons technology.
“If our project to modernize the F-16 aircraft fails while Greece realizes its projects, the Greek side will gain the upper hand in combat aircraft in 2025,” warns former Turkish Air Force commander, General Abidin Unal.
The United States once again finds itself ensnared in the diverging interests of its feuding allies on NATO’s southeastern flank. Just before the Vilnius summit, President Biden emphasized the delicate balance: “Turkey is looking for modernization of F-16 aircraft. And [Prime Minister Kyriakos] Mitsotakis in Greece is also looking for some help. And so what I’m trying to put together is a little bit of a consortium where we’re strengthening NATO in terms of the military capacity of both Greece and Turkey, and allowing Sweden to come in. But it’s in play. It’s not done.”
The current delay primarily stems from Congress’s stance, with its conditionalities proving difficult for Turkey to accept. US Secretary of State Blinken’s statement after talks in Istanbul, mentioning the “final steps in the process of ratifying Sweden’s accession to NATO in the coming weeks,” raises eyebrows, leaving details undisclosed.
Amidst growing reports, particularly in the Greek press, of a possible decoupling of F-16 deliveries to Turkey and F-35 deliveries to Greece, success for Greek diplomacy seems imminent. Mitsotakis and Blinken celebrated the special quality of their relations in Crete, while the tone between Ankara and Washington has become increasingly strained. Failure to materialize the F-16 deal would further strain relations between the two capitals. And lest we forget, Sweden’s NATO membership would continue to hang in the balance.
Dr Ronald Meinardus is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
