North Macedonia polls to test EU drive
Outcome could muddle bilateral relations and further complicate accession process
Voters in North Macedonia head to the polls on Wednesday for the first round of presidential elections, in a test vote that could define the country’s EU perspective.
The tiny Balkan country changed its name in 2018, after signing the Prespes Agreement with Greece, in a process set to open its accession path to NATO and the EU. Even though it managed to join NATO in 2020, the EU accession stalled for a number of reasons, including a dispute with Bulgaria over language and cultural heritage and EU enlargement fatigue.
Opinion polls indicate that the conservative main opposition VMRO-DPMNE party maintains a lead in polls and is expected to replace the social democrat SDSM, who have run the country since 2017, even though a coalition will be needed in order to form a government.
Seven candidates are contesting on Wednesday, but the two front-runners are incumbent Stevo Pendarovski, who is supported by the ruling SDSM, and Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, who is supported by the conservative main opposition VMRO-DPMNE.
The runoff vote is expected to take place on May 8, together with the parliamentary elections. More than 40% of the country’s 1.8 million registered voters will have to show up for the result to be valid.
The VMRO-DPMNE has repeatedly said that it does not commit to the constitutional changes “dictated” by Bulgaria and called for a new EU framework for the country’s negotiations process. Party leader Hristijan Mickoski has also said that if elected prime minister, he would refer to the country solely as “Macedonia,” regardless of the Prespes Agreement.
The election outcome could muddle North Macedonia’s bilateral relations with Greece and Bulgaria, and further complicate its EU accession process.
The voters are mainly concerned with the deteriorating quality of life, corruption and the continuous brain drain.
“There is a sense that the government did not deliver on its main promise: ‘No justice, no peace,’” said Simonida Kacarska from the European Policy Institute in Skopje. “Voters are concerned by the deteriorating circumstances in the health and the education system by depopulation. These issues are very much linked to the political and economic development, which is linked to the EU accession.”
Fading EU dream
Support for the EU dropped to 65%, from the 85-90% it stood at when the country initially received candidate status in 2005. After being kept for so many years in the waiting room, the EU perspective is challenged in the broader region.
Hristijan Mickoski has said that if elected prime minister, he would refer to the country solely as ‘Macedonia’
“For the region, for North Macedonia, and for the credibility of the enlargement process itself, the most devastating moment was the 2019 French veto right after the breakthrough created by the Prespes Agreement and the name change,” said Marko Trosanovski, president of the Institute for Democracy IDSCS in Skopje.
“It was a ‘huge historical mistake,’ as [then president of the European Commission Jean-Claude] Juncker put it at that time,” Trosanovski said, adding that the agreement “gave a boost to the otherwise lethargic EU enlargement among the Western Balkans public and the political elites. For a short while, there was radiant enthusiasm that merit is reintroduced in the enlargement and that reforms are worth the effort.”
Then, the Bulgarian veto followed, with Sofia saying it will only lift its veto if Skopje recognizes a Bulgarian minority in the country’s constitution.
“We fell prey to the fatigue in the EU, but the leaders of countries in the region just stopped also the necessary work that was done,” said Kacarska. She noted that the geopolitical importance of the enlargement has somehow revived after the Russian invasion, but it requires time and sustained effort from both sides.
Delicate balance
EU membership negotiations with North Macedonia – and fellow-candidate Albania – began in 2022. But Bulgaria’s demands are a condition set by the EU negotiation framework for the process to continue. A two-thirds majority is required in parliament in order for constitutional changes to pass.
Analysts argue it is very possible that – despite the harsh rhetoric VMRO uses – a political deal is in the making for the constitutional changes to move ahead.
Both the ruling SDSM and opposition VMRO firmly agree that the EU and NATO are strategic priorities for the country.
“We are yet to see how and under which conditions the government will be formed,” said Kacarska of the EPI.
“There will be so much bargaining between the first and second round of the presidential elections and there are many scenarios in which potentially the constitutional changes can take place,” she added and noted that while the VMRO has been opposing them, it has been rather reluctant to outline a clear path on how it will proceed, as it doesn’t want to compromise the country’s EU perspective.
Whichever government is elected it will not have a qualified majority and a political consensus will be needed, as was the case with the name change.
The Albanian parties are also set to play a significant role in the formation of the new government, as well as the constitutional vote. Traditionally, at least one party from the Albanian community, which is 25% of the country’s population, is part of the coalition government. For the last 20 years, the political scene has been dominated by the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), the largest ethnic Albanian political party in North Macedonia and the third largest political party in the country.
“Many cases of nepotism, impunity and – for many – indications of high-level corruption, resulted in a new opposition block of smaller Albanian parties that mobilized significant citizen support ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections,” explained Trosanovski.
This new bloc could potentially join a coalition with VMRO, while the two parties also nominated presidential candidates.
“It is worth noting that presence of the two Albanian candidates is a proxy arena for greater regional influence between [Albania’s Prime Minister] Edi Rama and [Kosovo Prime Minister] Albin Kurti over the ethnic Albanians in the Western Balkans with occasional acts of explicit and implicit meddling in the internal affairs of North Macedonia,” Trosanovski noted.
