Erdogan’s re-election and Greece
The re-election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan ends the debate about how Turkey would behave towards Greece under a different leader and, consequently, how Greece would deal with this reality. In the same context, another question – for some, a concern – that was in the minds of many, will not be raised; and that was if the United States and Europe would have been more willing to support Ankara’s positions under a seemingly more western-oriented Turkish leader.
The election cycles – both presidential and parliamentary – in Turkey are over and despite the deep division in the neighboring country, as confirmed by the relatively thin margin (52%-48%) of his win, Erdogan will continue to be the all-powerful decision-maker; one assumes with the same revisionist approach for our region and maximalist dreams for a global role.
Given the continuation of Erdogan’s presidency for another five years, two developments offer some, albeit limited, hope for moving the Greek-Turkish equation to a more positive direction.
First, Greece’s immediate reaction and sincere willingness to help Turkey after the painful devastation of the recent earthquakes has changed the atmosphere and created room for Ankara and Athens potentially mending fences. During the last few months, the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries met in a more hopeful climate. There was no movement on the issues, but in both cases the two sides expressed support for improved relations.
Second, if under the looming economic crisis, the Turkish President opts for – or is forced to pursue – closer cooperation with the West, as the Arab investments he expects will not suffice, then one can imagine a context in which the aggressiveness towards Greece recedes. He has already changed course in his approach to Israel, Egypt, even Syria.
“It is in everyone’s interest here to work towards peace,” US Ambassador to Greece George Tsunis told me during a fireside discussion at the recent Delphi Economic Forum, sharing his belief that there is “a desire on both sides of the Aegean to seek peace and compromise.”
Although Erdogan might have changed the tone of his rhetoric from threatening to more conciliatory, there are no signs he has abandoned nationalism as his guiding ideology.
Athens definitely prefers peace and cooperative coexistence and is willing to work towards that end, utilizing the International Court of Justice as a potentially necessary vehicle of getting there. But if Erdogan continues to push forward with his “Blue Homeland” doctrine, not to mention his expressed support for revising the Lausanne Treaty, one has to wonder what seeking a “compromise” could really mean.
