‘Erdoganism’ is not for the faint-hearted
The Turkish runoff elections and the expected, yet not triumphant, win of Recep Tayyip Erdogan frame the state’s future for the next several decades, bypassing the normative re-elected president’s five-year electoral term.
Throughout the 20th century, Turkey kept introducing itself to the international system as Ataturk’s achievement, breaking free from the imperial legacy of the past. Nevertheless, no state emerges as a tabula rasa in the international environment. Even during the undisputed Kemalist dominance, political Islam, suppressed by the concept of “laiklik” [laicism], continued to represent the Anatolian masses by large. This can be clearly seen in the qualitative data of the Turkish local elections from the early 1950s until the late 80s, a gradual enhancement of the quantitative variables of political Islam that led Necmettin Erbakan first to the premiership and Erdogan only a few years later.
Erdogan had the time and capability to lead Turkey through a long process of systemic changes since 2003. He opened the gates of the public sector, especially of the military and justice, to non-Kemalist families, made hijab legal for the first time in Turkish history, openly and publicly reassessed the western orientation of the state transforming Turkey into the eastern apple of discord among the Great Powers, made Turkey totally dependable by Russia in the energy sector, while he also succeeded in rejuvenating the Turkish economy for a limited period of time based on the glass feet of tourism and real estate.
His last electoral victory must be seen as his swan song, a victory his entourage wanted more than himself, not because he disregards the benefits of staying in control but because he does not see himself as only a politician anymore. From the evening of May 28 and until he concludes his term in office, Erdogan will focus on his legacy rather than Turkey’s foreign policy and economy, preferring to talk directly with Clio, the muse of history. Erdogan will construct the necessary sociopolitical infrastructure to transform his period in power since the early 21st century into a coherent ideological formula, i.e. “Erdoganism” that will openly contradict and antagonize Kemalism. This will put under stern test the unity of the state since Kemalism maintains its electoral support and Turkey’s status in the western pole. It is more than true that Erdogan is largely attracted by the authoritarian axis rather than the free world, however it remains to be seen if he has the stamina and the support to change the orientation of the state. Personally, I consider such a move quite unlikely since the ultra-nationalist political elites that control a large part of the National Assembly feel quite happy with the role of the ‘prodigy son,’ or must I say that of the tail-straight-up-Grey-Wolf that certain circles of the West find it as quite interesting?
No one can predict if Erdogan will succeed with this Herculean task. The most important step is to find the suitable and willing ‘priesthood’ that will take up the initiative to guard his political legacy after the end of his political career. Ataturk’s priesthood was the army and it will not be totally unrealistic to see a repetition of this with Erdoganism too, however, this time few top journalists and academics may also be included in the ‘companion of the Ring’ since every ideology to flourish needs nowadays a team of top influencers. In the following years, those who follow Turkish politics will be in the position of monitoring the moves of an aficionado of political strategy on the Turkish chessboard, transcending from the mortal status quo of a premier to the immortal prevailing ideology of the state. This would be a hell of a ride, for sure, and certainly not for the faint-hearted.
P.S. Various Greek analysts forecast that Erdogan’s re-election means the opening of a new difficult chapter for Greek-Turkish relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. I will abstain from these predictions. Not because Erdogan will decide to bury his revisionist agenda but because Athens seems after so many years to be able to control Turkey’s narcissism.
Spyros N. Litsas is professor of international relations theory at the University of Macedonia.
