Must the Left lose?
Democracies thrive on opposition – it is their distinctive characteristic. Forty years ago, a senior British minister, days before an election, commented that he thought landslide majorities were a bad thing because, on the whole, they did not produce “successful governments.” Mrs Thatcher – not known for her tolerance of different opinions – quickly sacked him for talking nonsense.
The landslide victory of Kyriakos Mitsotakis last June seemed to make him and his government invincible. It was an historic turning point. Against the backdrop of Greece making significant economic progress, SYRIZA played a poor hand badly. Even if the vote for New Democracy didn’t quite hit the highest levels, that for SYRIZA collapsed. The PM would be supreme.
Yet, the terrible events of the summer signal that governments, whatever the size of their majorities, face risks. A government elected for its pragmatism and competence has been attacked for the failures of the “executive state.” No matter whether these criticisms are valid or not, the political mood has changed, at least for the present. On September 16 in Thessaloniki, Mitsotakis had to defend his reputation.
In May and June, some voters returned to PASOK. But they remain the junior party on the center-left. Today, the focus is the leadership election within SYRIZA: the choice between Effie Achtsioglou and Stefanos Kasselakis. They, and their defeated rivals, have signaled different strategies for the party to win back support.
Can they do so? Let’s consider what the wider European picture tells us. First, almost 150,000 voted on September 17 in the SYRIZA elections and, of those, 40,000 were new “members.” The election system was overwhelmed. Proportionately, in comparison to the numbers voting in party leadership elections in other European countries, this involvement is very high and impressive.
The election mechanism itself is intriguing. An open electoral system is inherently unpredictable. It’s the “EasyJet” business model applied to politics: a no “fuss,” no “extras” entry system. Who the “passengers” are who join is unknowable in advance. The outcomes can be counterintuitive: A traditional, party selection system can produce a media celebratory – Tony Blair – while an open process can select the ideologically devout – Jeremy Corbyn. The SYRIZA case is a fascinating TV reality show that has engaged people.
Secondly, almost all EU countries have a political competition that revolves around “left” and “right.” I do not share the view that the political momentum is inexorably moving away from the left. Across Europe, the current climate of ideas is more complex. After 2008, the “expansionary austerity” of neo-classical economics, advocated by Professor Alberto Alesina (Harvard) and others, was the orthodoxy: the idea that cuts in government spending would boost market confidence leading to investment and growth. The EU’s response to the recessionary impact of the Covid pandemic has followed a very different economic paradigm, however: Even Chancellor Merkel accepted the need for public money to boost growth. The European Recovery and Resilience Fund that started two years ago provides an impressive stimulus of over €720 billion.
And on the big challenges of the future – climate change, protecting the environment, ensuring energy security, dealing with demographic change as societies grow older, better health services etc – the European public mood is for governments to do more, not less. Ideas have moved on and the expectations of voters are different. In Greece, there is a natural base of support for an active government steering national development – all governments since Konstantinos Karamanlis in the 1950s have endeavored to do so – while neoliberal ideas have never taken root, as the current PM’s father found.
Thirdly, the government remains potentially vulnerable. It has downplayed the role of ideology: Rather, its appeal is that it will “deliver.” But deliver for whom? How and when the benefits of economic growth are shared across the population are questions that leave space for political contestation over values and priorities. Today, there are many Greeks who feel they are not sharing in the recovery and/or feel precarious in the employment market.
Fourthly, as what happened this summer shows, an appeal on the basis of managerial competence puts a government under severe pressure when things go wrong. No government, whatever its majority, can control “events”: The unexpected can destabilize a government, as many have learnt.
Fifthly, incumbency for Mitsotakis after two full terms of power can itself be a problem. By 2027, voters may be ready for a fresh face to lead the country. A consecutive three-term period in office would be unique in post-1974 Greece and exceptional in Europe.
So, even before we factor into the equation who SYRIZA chooses as its leader, there are at least five structural reasons why the Left in Greece is not doomed to fail. And this is a balance sheet that is good for democracy: Most would accept that Greece today would benefit from an effective opposition.
Kevin Featherstone is professor and director of the Hellenic Observatory at the LSE.
