The world is in a mess… it usually is
After a period of uncertainty and speculation as to his whereabouts, Oscar Wilde responded to journalists’ questions by declaring, “Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.” Those convinced that current international threats and instability presage the decline of the West warrant a similar response.
Even before the end of the Cold War, the international system was polycentric. The other emerging power centers have experienced fluctuating fortunes, however. Few now refer to the threat posed by the BRICS, a previously fashionable term denoting Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, alongside China. Putin’s adventures in Ukraine have exposed the weaknesses of his conventional forces: Amateur soldiers have proved stronger than his troops, which have shown disorganization and low morale. Drones bought from Iran have inflicted much damage in Ukraine these last weeks, but they expose Moscow’s incapacity. And, in Iran itself schoolgirls are bravely protesting on an agenda rooted in Western norms. Further afield, the re-elected President Xi Jinping is shifting China to a system of personal power and greater autocracy that risks greater future political and social challenge at home.
Taken together, the international system is still dominated by North America and Europe. They dominate the G7 and organizations like the World Bank. Approximately 80% of official reserves in the world are held in either the dollar or the euro. Other economies may fear being excluded from the SWIFT financial messaging service: as was Iran and as Russia was almost. The military capacity of the West remains superior: About 70% of military spending in the world is in the name of the US and its allies. Culturally, giants like Google dominate the internet and the world watches Netflix or Hollywood.
The West today again faces tremors, but its structural superiority will survive for at least a generation, and, beyond that, any predictions are akin to fiction. The costs of the pandemic and of war in Ukraine have disrupted the fiscal position of national governments. A fresh financial crisis appears a plausible medium-term risk. In the UK, neoliberal jihadists experimented with a peculiar policy mix: high debt and tax cuts, and they failed. The (financial) markets had no confidence in the free marketeers who had abandoned “sound money” principles.
The West today again faces tremors, but its structural superiority will survive for at least a generation, and, beyond that, any predictions are akin to fiction
The shocks are ones of self-confidence and trust. Old paradigms are no longer delivering and public expectations have moved on. Indeed, social inclusion and distributive politics are back in vogue. Center-right governments around the world are now pump-priming the economy in a “retro-Keynesian” flourish, rejecting the austerity they had prescribed after the 2008 crash.
Our politics remain on a conflictual upswing. The failures of mainstream leaders in the past fuel the insidious appeal of identity politics. The dark side of electoral politics hovers: Bolsonaro and Erdogan may be re-elected, Orban and Kaczynski still dominate – each in systems that were already fragile democracies. The US midterm elections may bolster the prospects of Trump’s return.
Relations between neighbors are threatening military adventures. Erdogan is rekindling past Turkish aggression. Iran fosters conflict in the Middle East. The US is taking risks over Taiwan. China is a greater military presence in the Pacific. Regional balances are being adjusted. But that is their scope: They are not redefining the world order in its fundamentals.
We were told in the 1970s the West was in decline. Then, as now, the world looked to be in a mess. Japan would challenge the US economically. The Soviet Union seemed ever more powerful. Today, we again need to be cautious. Oscar Wilde said it best.
Kevin Featherstone is professorial research fellow at the London School of Economics and the director of its Hellenic Observatory.
