The far-right: A fragmented, not emerging force
What has been extensively discussed since the election? The resounding victory of New Democracy, which was also a personal triumph for conservative leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis; the defeat of SYRIZA; the relatively modest performance of PASOK (which received only a fraction of the votes that SYRIZA lost); the resurgence of Zoe Konstantopoulou through her party, Course of Freedom. However, a significant point of discussion has also been the entrance of three far-right parties into the Greek Parliament.
We used to believe that the country had moved past phenomena like the outlawed neo-Nazi group Golden Dawn, which was ruled a criminal organization in 2020. However, the situation is not as straightforward as it seems, as there is a significant amount of similar ideological “material” dispersed within Greek society. Now, alongside Kyiakos Velopoulos’ Greek Solution party, we also have the reincarnation of the neo-Nazi group as the Spartiates (Spartans), and the pro-Russian, Christian fundamentalist Niki (Victory) party, based in northern Greece.
This troubling phenomenon is linked to the widespread conspiracy theories and the anti-systemic political religion that thrived during the financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Regardless, Greek society has always demonstrated a strong inclination toward suspicion and conspiracy theories. In every country, such inclinations are consistently associated with a tendency to question democratic institutions, sometimes even harboring direct hostility toward them.
However, I have a sense that these three parties indicate more of a fragmentation within that particular ideological sphere rather than an emerging force. Essentially, one far-right party opposes another, perceiving them as competitive entities with justified suspicion.
Τhese three parties indicate more of a fragmentation within that particular ideological sphere rather than an emerging force
This is another longstanding Greek tradition: the inability to engage in basic cooperation and communication, a fact we are well aware of, especially considering how much the smaller extreme-left parties relish in their animosity toward each other.
However, let us not deceive ourselves: The symptoms and obsessions that we readily label as “far-right” (such as anti-vaccination sentiments, the allergy to democratic institutions, and perpetually stoking fear about “dangerous foreigners”) are also prevalent within the mainstream of the so-called democratic spectrum.
These parties have had no reservations about collaborating with far-right groups in the past, from the time of LAOS to the Independent Greeks (ANEL), who joined hands with SYRIZA in 2015. And even though the country was at a critical juncture in the former case, SYRIZA had a choice in the latter: Instead of aligning with ANEL, it could have cooperated with the now-defunct centrist party To Potami. However, it didn’t, instead labeling the anti-Semitic and homophobic ANEL “center-right” and branding To Potami the “extreme center” (implying they were crypto-fascists). Moreover, New Democracy, which once again won the political center, has members within its ranks who originate from the far-right sphere and have previously expressed extreme views.
Let’s bear these factors in mind so that we aren’t easily taken aback by the rise of far-right absurdities. The archaic elements within Greek society cut across parties and continue to thrive in 2023.
