A winter of decisions on Ukraine
Ukraine might not be in the news as much as Gaza these days, but its war against the Russian invaders is at a crucial point. The counterattack of the past few months does not appear to have had the desired results, the Western allies are showing signs of fatigue and are arguing among themselves, the Russians are not quitting, finding support among many countries, and the winter looks as if it will be much colder than last year’s. Conditions on all fronts are worsening, which might suggest that negotiations for a ceasefire may be in the air. Because Kyiv – like every other government – cannot agree to the loss of territory, we might be moving towards a pause in hostilities on the basis of the map as it is now, with negotiations for a final agreement left for the future.
But even a temporary ceasefire demands that both sides understand that it is not in their favor for hostilities to continue, and they must believe that the enemy will not exploit the opportunity to strengthen his forces before resuming the war. Here the question is whether anyone can trust Vladimir Putin to sign an agreement and to keep it. The very fact that he chose to invade Ukraine shows that he was ill-advised on how Kyiv, Washington, Berlin, Brussels and other capitals would react, and also that he misjudged the capabilities of his own armed forces. That the Russian president could be so badly mistaken on these two essential points makes him unpredictable. But he does wield two weapons which show up the asymmetric nature of this struggle far more than the size of the two countries and their forces: The Russian government seems indifferent to the losses its own forces are suffering, and it possesses nuclear weapons. If Putin feels directly threatened, no one can rule out his thinking, “What good are these things if we don’t use them?” (Much like his friend Trump mused when he was president).
If the two sides move towards a ceasefire, how will the situation play out in the region and internationally? Ukraine cannot commit itself to not joining NATO (putting the process on hold, at most) and will seek to be armed by the West in a way that will deter further Russian aggression. Russia will get a breather from the Western-led sanctions and will have more money to spend on arms and to invest in cultivating other countries in the anti-Western bloc. So, both sides have reason to fear that a ceasefire will benefit their enemy. What remains to be seen is how factors beyond their control will force them to the negotiating table. With winter perhaps the strongest among them.
