Wolfgang Schaeuble: A convenient scapegoat
There was no need for Wolfgang Schaeuble to depart this futile world for us to grasp that he was despised by a section of the Greek population. Germany’s former finance minister was held accountable for what we endured during the bailout period. He indeed represented the typical ethos of the “virtuous” northern states, incapable of tolerating the living standards of the “sinful” South, in line with their economic performance. Thus, when these righteous northerners found their first victim, they vented their punitive resentments. Unfortunately, Greece happened to be that victim.
All is well up to this point. Problems arise when we question what happened, and Greece fell into the hands of the “virtuous” states. What did we do wrong, and why did we seek their help?
We cannot turn a blind eye to the structural pathologies of our national economy and the inadequacy of our political system
Those who still curse the late Schaeuble argue that it was the bailouts that led to the financial crisis, not that the bailouts were the inevitable outcome of the development model of the post-dictatorship era (known in Greece as the Metapolitefsi), mismanagement during the 2004-2009 period, and the wrong political choices made in 2010. Therefore, they claim that the bailouts and those who implemented them are responsible for what we went through. Let’s not forget the other “culprit,” Andreas Georgiou, the former head of the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT), who was accused of falsifying the 2009 deficit figure, increasing it from 13.5% of GDP to 15.5%.
Undoubtedly, the first bailout program had excessive harshness and, as those who designed it admit, it had incorrect coefficients – an acknowledgment in hindsight and based on results that only has historical significance. On the other hand, we cannot turn a blind eye to the structural pathologies of our national economy and the inadequacy of our political system. We were proceeding carelessly, leadership and citizens alike, down the path of fictitious prosperity, considering loans as income. Naturally, at some point, we had to face the consequences.
Schaeuble bears no responsibility for this entire course. We can discuss what happened afterward, but his greater responsibility was that he viewed the European Union through the lens of the German economy, in other words, with a shortsighted perspective.
