Will an opponent be found for ND in 2024?
In 2023, an unprecedented political scenario was created in Greece’s post-dictatorship history. The electoral dominance of New Democracy, as reflected in the double elections of May and June, its steady demographic lead, the collapse of SYRIZA, the emergence of smaller parties of an ultraconservative character, and the overall fragmentation of the opposition, constitute unusual conditions, a consequence to a large extent of the economic and political crisis at the beginning of the last decade.
Is anything expected to change in 2024 or will the country continue to go through what is called “a political system of one and a half parties” and with the “half” even in decline? The answer will depend mainly on three parameters.
First, on the course of the government and the country as a whole. It is a cliche, but it is also true that the government’s biggest opponents now – especially after the elimination of the SYRIZA “bogeyman” – are the problems themselves. Despite whatever managerial weaknesses there were in its first term, New Democracy created the sense that things were in order and emitted a sense of stability, which it capitalized on electorally. Today, the economic outlook looks positive and many difficult reforms have already been carried out. However, there are still areas that remain problematic, and the issue of accuracy undermines any macroeconomic achievements. But as long as the prevailing feeling is that things are going relatively well, as long as there are sectors of the economy that are moving forward and as long as positive news is produced for the country, the government can be optimistic.
Second, by the tone of the government and its handling of individual issues. The predominance of New Democracy is a given, but it does not constitute a blank check. And this was clearly evident in the second round of the local elections, where the electorate’s reaction to a possible absolute dominance of New Democracy contained clear political messages. “Hegemony” can prove fragile if it is perceived as an element of arrogance, while unfortunate handling can serve as an occasion to manifest an untraceable creeping discontent. State inefficiency in the face of a (new) natural disaster, a scandal, an adverse decision, regrettable statements, or a legislative or political initiative that has not been properly prepared strategically and communicatively, can cause greater-than-expected damage, especially in a political environment that still has elements of instability.
All this is of course related to the third parameter, which is the image of the opposition. New Democracy is responsible for its own course, but the opposition parties need to look at their own strategy. This often boils down to either aphorisms (which proved in the recent elections to be ineffective) or denunciations against the “arrogance of the 41%,” without doing anything to challenge it effectively.
2024 is expected to be quite decisive for the opposition, as next June’s European elections will decide a lot about internal correlations. If for the government the challenge is to avoid major disunity, which would create a climate of instability, as well as the emergence of a very “threatening player” on its right, for the opposition the big issue is who will have the upper hand in the next day’s developments. Which will most likely not be linear, but rather the starting point for broader developments. SYRIZA, if Stefanos Kasselakis does not achieve the (very ambitious) goals he has set, will inevitably enter a new round of introversion. The loss of second place and the role it had for a decade as the other pole in our political system will probably lead to a new test of its cohesion.
PASOK, which, according to opinion polls, seems to be regaining second place, will have to prove that it is not limited to meager gains from the right and from the left, but that it can do more than that. In other words, that it can lead the broader opposition as a whole, leading to its reconstitution. This may sound somewhat theoretical or far-fetched today, but the day after the European elections it is a debate that is likely to open up and will not be easy at all. For the smaller parties, the European elections will determine their dynamics on the political scene. For some, such as the right-wing populist Greek Solution, it may confirm their upward trend in the polls, while for parties that are hovering around the 3% threshold, whether or not they exceed the standards will also determine their viability.
In the debate on any developments, the wider international environment cannot be ignored, such as the developments on both fronts in Ukraine and the Middle East. The situation in the EU after the European elections, whether we will have a further strengthening of the “anti-systemic” “radical” parties or a resumption of the political pendulum. And of course the US elections, where a return of Donald Trump to the White House seems quite likely.
2024 therefore looks like a year which, although no spectacular changes are expected in the field of domestic political correlations, is likely to be crucial in terms of how the “pawns” will be set up for the next political contest.
Eftychis Vardoulakis is a strategy and communications consultant.
