Erdogan’s new diplomatic turn: A rapprochement with the West unfolds
Vladimir Putin conveyed his congratulations to the Turkish president on his 70th birthday via telephone earlier this week. The two had last spoken on the phone back in October. During the heyday of their relationship, a monthly telephone exchange between Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan was a regular part of their political routine.
Relations between Moscow and Ankara are currently strained, as evidenced by the abrupt cancellation of the Russian president’s planned visit to Turkey in mid-February. There are several signs indicating a deterioration in Russian-Turkish relations.
This trend coincides with a significant improvement in Turkey’s relations with the West, sparking talks of normalization in various quarters. “The number of issues on which we think alike or agree with the United States is increasing,” stated Erdogan on his return flight from a recent visit to Egypt. Relations between Washington and Ankara had been strained for months, with discussions in American circles emerging about a NATO without Turkish participation.
The turning point in the downward spiral was Turkey’s long-delayed ratification of Sweden’s accession to NATO. Ultimately, the issue was no longer about the Scandinavian country. In exchange for lifting the blockade, Turkey secured Washington’s approval for the delivery of state-of-the-art F-16 fighter jets.
In a complex, synchronized process, the Americans linked the sale of F-16 jets to Ankara with a commitment to supply technologically advanced F-35 class aircraft to Greece. On this occasion, Washington discreetly but firmly communicated to the quarreling allies on the southeastern flank of the Alliance that the aircraft were not meant to be used against each other.
We are currently witnessing a new, positive momentum in US-Turkish relations. Shortly after the US Congress approved the arms deal with Ankara, a statement by Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland caused a stir: “If we could get through this S-400 issue, which we would like to do, the US would be delighted to welcome Turkey back into the F-35 family.”
As a reminder, Washington expelled Turkey from the F-35 production program in 2019 after Erdogan purchased the Russian S-400 missile defense system. Since then, the issue of Putin’s missiles has soured relations between Ankara and Washington more than almost any other.
While there are no indications that Erdogan is willing to part with the Russian weapons, the conditional invitation from the Americans regarding the F-35 alone demonstrates Washington’s heightened interest in a fresh political and diplomatic start with Erdogan. At a time when the specter of a major new war looms larger, international arms deals are taking center stage. Turkey is increasingly asserting itself as both a buyer and producer of modern warfare equipment.
Unlike the F-16 and F-35 issue, which dominated headlines in Greece and Turkey for weeks, Athens’ and Ankara’s decision to join the European Sky Shield initiative, which is equally significant in geostrategic terms, has received relatively little public attention.
There is speculation that Turkey’s participation in the Berlin-inspired European missile shield could positively impact arms policy cooperation between Germany and Turkey
This German initiative, launched in late 2022 against the backdrop of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, is seen by NATO and Berlin as necessary to bolster allied efforts, particularly in air defense, in response to Putin’s aggressive actions. The new initiative aims to address gaps in the European air defense system, particularly focusing on defense against high-altitude ballistic missiles, drones and cruise missiles.
The joint signing of the declaration of intent to join the European missile initiative by the defense ministers of Turkey and Greece, Yasar Guler and Nikos Dendias, indicates a significant improvement in relations between Athens and Ankara in recent months. Turkey’s signature carries additional political weight, especially concerning its relationship with the West, as the invitation was extended only after Turkey ratified Sweden’s accession to NATO. This process can be seen as another step toward normalizing Turkey’s relationship with the Western Alliance.
But the story doesn’t end there: There is speculation that Turkey’s participation in the Berlin-inspired European missile shield could positively impact arms policy cooperation between Germany and Turkey.
Turkey’s expressed interest in purchasing Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets is noteworthy. This combat aircraft is produced by a European consortium involving the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany. While London and Madrid are keen on a lucrative arms deal with Ankara, negotiations have faltered due to Berlin’s opposition.
Indeed, the German government may now come under pressure to justify its veto position on the Eurofighter issue while simultaneously involving Turkey in the strategically important Western arms initiative.
Citing a source at the Turkish Ministry of Defense, the BBC’s Turkish Service reports that Ankara is hopeful for a “positive stance” from Berlin. The Foreign Ministry in Berlin declined to comment on the matter, stating, “In principle, the German government’s restrictive arms export policy remains unchanged.”
Not long ago, German officials were similarly noncommittal regarding arms deals with Saudi Arabia. Berlin’s recent approval of the sale of Eurofighter fighter jets to Riyadh has buoyed Turkish hopes regarding the Eurofighters.
Erdogan’s pro-Western turn is expected to increase pressure on Berlin to reconsider its restrictive stance on the arms deal with Ankara.
Dr Ronald Meinardus is a senior research fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
